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Abstract
This Essay focuses on one aspect of the work of the European Court, that of judicial protection
of the individual, an area where it appears that the Court has taken steps towards the creation of a
common law for Europe, or ius commune.
JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF THE




I am honored to write in this edition of the Fordham Interna-
tional Law Journal dedicated to President Ole Due. I had the
privilege to work as a R~frendaire, legal secretary, at the Euro-
pean Court ofJustice ("Court ofJustice" or "Court") of the Euro-
pean Communities to The Hon. Mr. Justice Thomas F.
O'Higgins, former Chief Justice of Ireland, and Judge of the
Court from 1985 to 1991. During that time, I came to know Ole
Due, first as Judge, and then as President of the Court. Like
everyone who worked at the Court, and those who appeared
before him, I appreciated President Due's judicial skills and fair-
ness. On a personal level, I recall particularly his simplicity of
manner, his genuine interest in young staff members, and his
unforced informality. I welcome this opportunity to join in this
tribute to President Due.
It is difficult not to be impressed by what has been created
by the judges in Luxembourg since the constitution of the
Court.1 Many observers have compared their work to that of the
pioneering U.S. constitutional judges, such as ChiefJustice John
Marshall. One may also use another analogy, drawn from the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, when the King's judges in
the Palace of Westminster created the common law in a proce-
dure remarkably similar to that of the Article 177 reference of
the EC Treaty.2 Similar to the King's judges, the European
judges, while few in number, are engaged in the process of creat-
* Professor of European Law and Director of the Centre for the Law of the Euro-
pean Union, University College London; Of Counsel, Coudert Brothers. This Essay is
based on a lecture given by the Author to the Academy of European Law.
1. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261
U.N.T.S. 167, as amended in TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (EC
Off'l Pub. Off. 1987).
2. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R.
573 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made 6y Treaty on European Union,
Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719, 31 I.L.M. 247 [hereinafter
TEU].
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ing a new legal order over a remarkably short period in time.
This Essay focuses on one aspect of the work of the European
Court, that of judicial protection of the individual, an area
where it appears that the Court has taken steps towards the crea-
tion of a common law for Europe, or ius commune.
I. DEVELOPING A BODY OF LAW FOR PROTECTION OF
THE INDIVIDUAL
The Court of Justice has developed a remarkable case law
concerning judicial protection of the individual. Initially based
on direct effect, the case law concerning judicial protection of
the individual subsequently developed on rights and remedy ba-
ses.' The first generation case law involves issues such as direct
effect, primacy of Community law, and the autonomy of the
Community legal order.
The second generation case law deals with the relationship
of national law and Community law as regards enforcement of
Community law rights.4 This case law is built on the assumption
that national rules will apply in resolving disputes that are
founded in Community law, in areas such as unjust enrichment
and remedies. Clearly this may lead to lack of uniformity as the
effective enforcement of Community law rights may differ from
one Member State to another, depending on national provisions
for enforcement.5
In response to this problem, the Court has recently fash-
3. From a vast literature, see most recently, Roberto Caranta, Judicial Protection
Against Member States: A New Jus Commune Takes Shape, 32 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 703,
703-26 (1995); Deirdre Curtin & Kamiel Mortelmans, Application and Enforcement of Com-
munity Law By the Member States: Actors in Search of a Third Generation Script, in 2 INSTITU-
TIONAL DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF HENRY G. SCHERMERS
423-66 (1994); SACHA PRECHAL, DIRECTIVES IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw: A STUDY ON
EC DIRECTIVES AND THEIR ENFORCEMENT BY NATIONAL COURTS (1995); Walter Van
Gerven, Bridging the Gap Between Community and National Laws: Towards a Principle of
Homogeneity in the Field of Legal Remedies, 32 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 679-702 (1995).
4. Deirdre Curtin, The Decentralised Enforcement of Community Law Rights: Judicial
Snakes and Ladders, in CURTIN & O'KEEFFE, CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION IN EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY AND NATIONAL LAW 1, 33-49 (1992).
5. The Court's case law concerning unjust enrichment in the case of recovery of
taxes imposed by the Member States in violation of Community law is the classic exam-
ple. See Rewe v. Landwirtschaftskammer fur das Saarland, Case 33/76, [1976] E.C.R.
1997, [1977] 1 C.M.L.R. 533;Just v. Danish Ministry for Fiscal Affairs, Case 68/79, [1980]
E.C.R. 501, [1981] 2 C.M.L.R. 714.
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ioned6 a case law which, while co-existing with the first and sec-
ond generations, attempts to address uniformity by providing ef-
fective remedies in national legal orders as a matter of Commu-
nity law. This third generation case law, brilliantly characterized
by Curtin and Mortelmans,7 is based on the desire to provide
genuine solutions for the shortcomings of direct effect, or effet
utile, in the absence of adequate or effective national enforce-
ment measures of Community law rights.8 In the third-genera-
tion case law, the Court has developed a new cause of action in
Community law and has altered national rules pertaining to in-
terim relief and procedure. The third generation case law pene-
trates not only into the procedural laws of the Member States, it
has also effected private law, and other fields, including Member
State constitutional law.9
II. DEVELOPING PROCEDURES TO ENFORCE THE BODY
OF LAW
A. Directives Have Direct Effect
The Court's acceptance of the doctrine of direct effect goes
far beyond the wording of Article 189 of the Treaty.' 0 The
Treaty states "a directive shall be binding, as to the result to be
achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but
shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and
methods."" The Court has clearly been concerned with ensur-
ing the effet utile of Community law. The concern appears to be
linked to the notion of judicial protection of the individual.
Very often the principles of effet utile and judicial protection of
the individual appear together in the Court's decisions.' 2 In Van
Duyn v. Home Office, for example, the Court held that "the useful
effect [of a directive] would be weakened if individuals were pre-
vented from relying on it before their national courts."' 3 The
6. The Court's case law was not necessarily fashioned chronologically.
7. Curtin & Mortelmans, supra note 3.
8. Id. at 433-34.
9.. Regina v. Secretary of State For Transport ex parte Factortame Limited, Case C-
213/89, [1990] E.C.R. 1-2433, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 1.
10. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 189, [1992] C.M.L.R. at 693.
11. Id.
12. Caranta, supra note 3, at 705-06. Caranta remarks that it is not always easy to
distinguish the two principles which are deeply connected in the case law. Id.
13. Van Duyn v. Home Office, Case 41/74, [1974] E.C.R. 1337, [1974] 1 C.M.L.R.
903
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Court further solidified development of the two principles by
subsequently allowing individuals to rely on rights created by
Community directives where the directives were not imple-
mented by Member States within the stipulated time.' 4 In hold-
ing that a Member State may not plead, as against individuals, its
failure to perform the obligations the directive entails, 5 the
Court in Becker, 6 utilized the same reasoning of useful effect and
protection of the individual as in Van Duyn. 17 The holding was
later extended to cover other state authorities such as regional
or civic authorities."8 The Court also subsequently held that pro-
visions of national law must be interpreted in conformity with
Community law, even before the time limit for implementing a
directive has expired,19 although recent case law appears to cast
doubt upon such a proposition.20
In Marshall L the Court eliminated the possibility that direc-
tives might have horizontal direct effect.21 Horizontal direct ef-
fect would allow individuals to rely on the provisions of a direc-
tive, provided the directive met requirements of the direct effect
test, in cases solely involving individuals. The Marshall Ijudg-
ment left individuals in an absurd situation regarding access to
legal remedies. Individuals could rely on a directive if suing a
Member State or an emanation thereof but not if they were su-
ing an individual, even though the underlying problem might be
identical in both cases.22
B. Alternatives to Direct Effect
In light of controversy generated by the Marshall Ijudgment
it was not surprising that the Court subsequently changed
14. Becker v. Finanzamt Mfinster-Innenstadt, Case 8/81, [1982] E.C.R. 53, [1982]
1 C.M.L.R. 499.
15. Becker, [1982] E.C.R. at 73, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. at 514.
16. Id.
17. Van Duyn, [1974] E.C.R. at 1337, [1974] 1 C.M.L.R. at 16.
18. Fratelli Costanzo v. Comune di Milano, Case 103/88, [1989] E.C.R. 1839,
[1989] 3 C.M.L.R. 258.
19. Officier Van Justitie v. Kolpinghuis Nimegen, Case 80/86, [1987] E.C.R. 3969,
[1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 18.
20. Mundt v. Landrat des Kreises Schleswig-Flensburg, Case C,156/91, [1992]
E.C.R. 1-5567.
21. Marshall v. Southampton and South West Hampshire Area Health Authority,
Case 152/84, [1986] E.C.R. 723, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. 688 [hereinafter Marshall I].
22. See the opinion of Advocate General Van Gerven in Marshall II. Marshall II,
Case G-271/91, [1993] E.C.R. 1-4367, 1-4373, [1993] 3 C.M.L.R. 293, 301.
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course. Complementing the case law founded on the direct ef-
fect doctrine, the Court created a new remedies: based case law.
The Court had first intimated a new approach to the protection
of individual rights in von Colson,"2 where it relied on an exten-
sive interpretation of Article 5 of the Treaty24 to impose an obli-
gation on national courts to interpret national law in the light of
the wording and purpose of the directive. The Court specifically
introduced this approach in order to implement a directive
where no directly effective provision was available to provide an
adequate remedy. Subsequently, in Marleasing,2 5 the Court ex-
tended this obligation to national legislation adopted before the
directive, adding that national courts were required to interpret
national law "as far as possible" 26 with Community directives.
In Faccini Doi,2 7 the Court consolidated developments by
adding that if the result prescribed by a directive cannot be
achieved by way of interpretation, Community law requires the
Member States to compensate for any damage caused to individ-
uals through failure to transpose a directive. The requirement
was to exist, however, only so long as the conditions for state
liability set forth in Francovich28 are met.
The requirement of interpreting national laws in conform-
ity with a directive and the principle of Member State liability set
forth in Francovich are either complementary or alternative to
the doctrine of direct effect of directives.2 9 All three doctrines
have been developed by the Court in order to provide effective
judicial protection for the individual. The first two doctrines,
however, are built on the assumption that direct effect is not
necessary and that remedies may be available even where a direc-
tive has no direct effect. They allow individuals to claim reme-
dies based on a directive even in a horizontal situation, such as
that in Marleasing, thus, avoiding the denial of the remedy estab-
23. Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, Case
14/83, [1984] E.C.R. 1891, [1984]. 2 C.M.L.R. 430.
24. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 5, [1992] C.M.L.R. at 591.
25. Marleasing v. La Comercial Internacional de Alimentaci6n, Case C-106/89,
[1990] E.C.R. 1-4135, [1990] 1 C.M.L.R. 305.
26. Marleasing, [1990] E.C.R. at 1-4144, [1990] 1 C.M.L.R. at 311.
27. Faccini Dori v. Recreb Srl, Case C-91/92, [1994] E.C.R 1-3325, [1994] 1
C.M.L.R. 665.
28. Francovich v. Italy, Joined Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90, [1991] E.C.R. 1-5357,
[1993] 2 C.M.L.R. 66.
29. Van Gerven, supra note 3, at 682.
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lished by Marshall I. Both pending and subsequent case law will
establish the limits of Member State liability and the liability of
individuals for a breach of Community law in horizontal situa-
tions.30
C. Uniform Remedies to Protect Community Law Rights
Another development, that of the so-called third generation
case law of the Court, is equally arresting. In its earlier case law,
the Court had been reluctant to interfere in national procedural
issues.3' In cases such as Rewe, the Court held that each national
legal system should determine the procedural aspects of actions
relating to the individual rights protected by Community law.32
These earlier cases established the safeguard clause, indicating
that each national legal system could determine the procedural
aspects of actions relating to the protection of individual rights
protected by Community law, provided that domestic remedies
were effective, and no less favorable than those for the enforce-
ment of comparable national rights.33 In terms of remedies, the
national court must apply directly effective Community law
either under the existing provisions of national law, or on its
own motion, as required in Simmenthal.3' Initial reluctance to
interfere with national procedural remedies subsequently de-
clined. In particular, following Simmenthal, the Court insisted on
national courts' obligation to make effective judicial remedies
available. When necessary to provide effective judicial remedies,
national courts were to deny application of relevant national
procedural rules.3 5
The most decisive developments concerning effective judi-
cial protection, however, have occurred only recently. In
30. Brasserie du P~cheur, Case C-46/93 (Eur. Ct. J.) (not yet reported);
Factortame III, Case C-48/93 (Eur. Ct.J.) (not yet reported); Dillenkofer, Case C-187/
94 (Eur. Ct. J.) (not yet reported).
31. Caranta, supra note 3, at 705.
32. Rewe v. Landwirtschaftskammer ffr das Saarland, Case 33/76, [1976] E.C.R.
1989, [1976] 1 C.M.L.R. 533.
33. Id. at 1997-98; See also supra note 5 (discussing case law concerning unjust en-
richment).
34. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal, Case 106/77,
[1978) E.C.R. 629, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 263.
35. See, e.g., Amministrazione Delle Finanze Dello Stato v. San Giorgio, Case 199/
82, [1985] E.C.R. 3595, [1983] 2 C.M.L.R. 658;Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal
Ulster Constabulary, Case 222/84, [1986] E.C.R. 1651, [1986] 3 C.M.L.R. 240.
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Factortame I,36 for example, concerning national rules for interim
relief, the Court held that:
The full effectiveness of Community law would be just as
much impaired if a rule of national law could prevent a court
seised of a dispute governed by Community law from grant-
ing interim relief in order to ensure the full effectiveness of
the judgment to be given on the existence of the rights
claimed under Community law. It follows that a court which
in those circumstances would grant interim relief, if it were
not for a rule of national law, is obliged to set aside that
rule.
37
The national court was, therefore, obliged to set aside the rule of
national law which prevented it from granting interim relief.
In Zuckerfabrik,s8 the Court was confronted with a case that
combined elements of Factortame I and Foto-Frost.39 In the latter
case, it had held that only the Court itself may decide on the
invalidity of Community legislation. In Zuckerfabrik, the issue was
whether, in proceedings for interim relief, a national court
could suspend the operation of a national measure adopted on
the basis of a Community regulation and which was challenged
on the ground that the regulation itself violated Community law.
The difficulty was that, according to Foto-Frost, the national court
could not rule on the invalidity of the Community regulation,
but Factortame required effective judicial protection in interim
proceedings. Applying the two cases, the Court held that na-
tional courts could suspend enforcement of national administra-
tive measures adopted on the basis of Community regulation,
even though they could not rule on the invalidity of the Commu-
40 oretnity measure. In order to do so, however, serious doubts must
exist as to the validity of the national measure, an issue which
would ultimately be decided by the Court.4
Completely new in Zuckerfabrik were the Court's observa-
tions on the national rules of procedure governing interim re-
36. Factortame I, [1990] E.C.R. 2433, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 867.
37. See record 21 of the Factortame I decision. Id.
38. Zuckerfabrik Sfiderdithmarschen AG v. Hauptzollamt Itzehoe, Cases C-143/88
& C-92/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-415, [1991] 3 C.M.L.R. 1.
39. Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollamt Lfibeck-Ost, Case 314/85, [1987] E.C.R. 4199,
[1987] 3 C.M.L.R. 57.
40. Zuckerfabrik, [1991] E.C.R. at 1-542, [1991] 3 C.M.L.R. at 83.
41. See record 29 of the Zuckerfabrik decision. Id.
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lief. The Court noted that national rules differ from one Mem-
ber State to another. This differentiation jeopardizes the uni-
form application of Community law. Because the Court
considered uniform application of Community law a fundamen-
tal requirement of the Community legal order, it held that:
The suspension of enforcement of administrative measures
based on a Community regulation, whilst it is governed by
national procedural law, in particular as regards the making
and examination of the application, must in all the Member
States be subject, at the very least, to conditions which are
uniform so far as the granting of such relief is concerned.42
The result of Zuckerfabrik was, therefore, to establish a minimum
set of requirements for the granting of interim relief, including
such considerations as urgency. The implications of the judg-
ment are enormous because they challenge the view, repeated
by the Court in the very same case, that "the rules of the proce-
dure of the courts are a matter of national law."43 In short, Zuck-
erfabrik establishes standards of Community procedural law that
take priority over national rules of procedure. The Court's ap-
proach has been characterized as .a transition from a negative
application of the principle of effective judicial protection to a
positive one.44
The Francovich case further exemplifies this trend. In
Francovich, the Court premised state liability on principles of ef-
fective judicial protection of the individual and effet utile. The
Court stated that the principle of state liability was inherent in
the system of the Treaty.4" In so holding, the Francovich court
founded the individual's right to judicial protection directly on
Community Law.'
This new rule in the Community legal order has significant
consequences for the legal orders of the Member States. Be-
cause the principle of state liability derives from the Treaty, it
must apply in a uniform manner throughout the Community.
The Court held, however, that even though principles of state
liability derive from the Treaty, national liability rules still apply.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Caranta, supra note 3, at 714.
45. See record 35 of the Francovich decision. Francovich, [1991] E.C.R. at 1-5381,
[1993] 2 C.M.L.R. at 114.
46. Francovich, [1991] E.C.R. at 1-5382, [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. at 115.
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In the absence of Community legislation, therefore, it is for the
internal legal order of each Member State to designate compe-
tent courts and to establish detailed procedural rules to govern
actions intended to safeguard the rights which Community law
conveys to individuals.47
As a result of Francovich, the Court introduced a new cause
of action into the legal order of every Member State. The action
allows an award of damages in favor of an individual against a
Member State for damage caused by the State's breach of Com-
munity law.4" Like Factortame and Zuckerfabik, this new action in-
troduces significant change into the procedural laws of the
Member States. All three cases demonstrate enforcement of
Community law rights through the introduction of common
remedies, the setting aside of national law, the granting of new
procedural rights for interim relief, and the introduction of new
causes of action. The collective effect of such enforcement on
the national procedural rules will be enormous.
In Marshall 11,4 9 for example, the Court held that where a
Member State has chosen financial rewards as the compensation
for discriminatory dismissal, the compensation must be full and
adequate. National rules on compensation offering a lesser rem-
edy may not be applied. In so holding, the Marshall II decision
cuts across differing national damage rules to form a uniform
rule of compensation.
It is interesting to compare Francovich and Marshall II as re-
gards to damages. In Francovich, the amount of compensation
would be a pre-determined amount, whereas in Marshall II, the
fixing of damages is inevitably discretionary. According to Mar-
shall II, damages must be adequate in that they must make repa-
ration for the loss and damage sustained.50 The Marshall II deci-
sion mandates individual interpretation by national courts. The
interpretation and application of the Marshall II requirements,
therefore, may vary from one Member State to another as well as
internally within a Member State.
The underlying theme of Marshall II is interesting in that it.
is predicated upon the premise that Member States may choose
47. Id.
48. Francovich, [1991] E.C.R. at 1-5382, [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. 85-86.
49. Marshall II, [1993] E.C.R. at 1-4386, [1993] 3 C.M.L.R. at 318-19.
50. Id. at 1-4389, [1993] 3 C.M.L.R. at 324.
1996]
910 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 19:901
the means by which they achieve the aim of a Community direc-
tive so long as their choice is consistent with the aims of the di-
rective. In Marshall II, the Court realized that it faced only two
choices: reinstatement of the plaintiff by the national court or
damages. Although the Court accepted adequate damages as an
effective remedy, the possibility that the remedy for discrimina-
tory dismissal could differ from one Member State to another
remains.
Varying remedies is not an insignificant matter. Dismissal
in the current employment market can effectively mean the ter-
mination of a career, not simply of a given employment. Fur-
thermore, in establishing that adequate damages must be
awarded regardless of national award limitations, the Court has
imposed a new duty on national courts. The application of this
duty is difficult in the extreme. It is not clear to what extent
national courts may take national laws into account when assess-
ing damages. This is presumably the next step and if pursued by
the Court, will require the Court to provide far-reaching gui-
dance on basic principles of compensation. Inevitably this will
result in some form of harmonization.5 1
The apogee of this case law is Faccini Doi,5 2 where the Court
held that in cases where damage has been suffered as a result of
the State's obligation, the national court must "uphold the right
of aggrieved consumers to obtain reparation in accordance with
the national law on liability." 3 How this requirement is to be
applied in practice is not specified.54 Potential for serious proce-
dural difficulties will exist in some Member States.55 It is clear,
51. Curtin & Mortelmans, supra note 3, at 452-53; Van Gerven, supra note 3, at
694-95, 699.
52. Faccini Dori v. Recreb Sri, Case C-91/92, [1994] E.C.R 1-3325 [1994], 1
C.M.L.R. 665.
53. Faccini Dori, [1994] E.C.R. at 1-3358, [1994] 1 C.M.L.R. at 691.
54. There seem to be several possibilities: (i) may the State be drawn in to an
action by way ofjoinder, by procedural means unknown in some Member States; or (ii)
is the State to be sued directly as a co-respondent; or (iii) may the State be sued alone;
or (iv) may damages be awarded against the State even if it is not a party to the action;
or (v) must the action against the State be taken subsequent to the action between
individuals?
55. William Robinson, Annotation of Case C-91/92, Faccini Dori, 32 COMMON MKT. L.
Rv. 629-39 (1995). Robinson observes that national judges will either have to interpret
national laws so far as to be contra legem or to find a suitable national law on liability
upon which to found Francovich-based reparation. Id.
1996] JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF THE INDIVIDUAL 911
however, that the Court, although referring to national laws on
liability, is in fact harmonizing national legal remedies.
D. Towards a Remedies-based Case Law
There is a clear progression in the case law toward reme-
dies, although it cannot be characterized as linear or chronologi-
cal. Rejecting the application of a national rule because it con-
flicts with a Community rule, as required by Simmenthal and
Factortame, is largely a negative process. Alternatively, as Zuck-
erfabrik demonstrates, non-application of national rules leads to
the positive introduction of new, harmonized, and Community
based procedural rules. Francovich illustrates the next step: an
entirely new cause of action based only on Community law, and
enforceable in all Member States on the basis of national proce-
dural law. The ultimate goals to be achieved are the uniform
application of Community law and the effective judicial protec-
tion of the individual by the imposition of adequate sanctions
and remedies.56
The progression presented until now is perhaps too linear.
It has also elided the difference among cases whose characteriza-
tion may fall somewhere in between the second or third genera-
tion.57 In recent cases, the Court has retreated to national stan-
dards and procedures as regards retroactivity of claims in the ar-
eas of social security58 and equal pay.5 9 In the area of
employment law, in contrast, the Court granted a "third genera-
tion" remedy in Marshall 1H.60
56. Van Gerven considers that "the need for harmonized legal remedies.., is...
inherent in the concept of uniformity; in the absence of (sufficiently) harmonized legal
remedies, uniform rights cannot be adequately secured throughout the Community."
Van Gerven, supra note 3, at 690.
57. Curtin and Mortelmans describe Factortame I as "hovering around the thresh-
old of the third generation arch-way." Curtin & Mortelmans, supra note 3, at 438. They
describe the result in Fratelli Costanzo as being third generation in that it opts for a
uniform Community-wide solution. Id. at 443. UNECTEF v. Heylens and Re Purity Re-
quirements for Beer: EC Commission v. Germany are described as being early birds of the
third generation, yet examples of negative integration. Curtin & Mortlemans, supra
note 3, at 443, 448; Case 222/86, [1987] E.C.R. 4097, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. 901; Case 178/
84, [1987] E.C.R. 4097, [1988] 1 C.M.L.R. 780.
58. Steenhorst-Neerings, Case C-338/91, [1993] E.C.R 1-5475, [1993] 3 C.M.L.R.
341;Johnson II, Case C-410/92, [1994] E.C.R, 1-5483, [1994] 1 C.M.L.R. 749.
59. Vroege, Case C-57/93, [1994] E.C.R. 1-4541, [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. 881; Fisscher
Case C-128/93, [1994] ECR 1-4541, [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. 881.
60. Marshall II, [1993] E.C.R. 1-4367, [1993] 3 C.M.L.R. 293.
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These judgments may be distinguished on the theory that
where the Court allowed the application of national standards or
procedures, an adequate national remedy was available although
not a perfect one. In contrast, in Marshall II, only full compensa-
tion, rather than lesser compensation provided for under na-
tional law, would provide an adequate remedy. This is conso-
nant with Van Gerven's distinction between essential or constitu-
tive rules and rules laying down non-essential or non-constitutive
conditions.6 The availability of an imperfect remedy could be
considered a rule setting forth a non-essential condition. Pro-
vided that a national rule does not make enforcement impossi-
ble, enforcement would be, according to national rules. If only a
perfect remedy would suffice, the requirement of being an es-
sential or constitutive condition would be met, thus, justifying
enforcement through a third generation remedy.
Although this analysis is attractive because it explains the
recent national standards case law in a way that shows a con-
tinuity and coherence with the third generation case law, it begs
the question as to what is to be considered essential or constitu-
tive. Impossibility of enforcing rights is not an adequate crite-
rion because imperfect remedies will generally be available
under national law. Where national remedies are not available,
a von Colson remedy could be relied upon.
Thus far, Court of Justice case law has developed common
rules on state liability, judicial review, and interim remedies.
Commentators discern the emergence of a common law for Eu-
rope citing uniform causes of action and uniform remedies cre-
ated as a result of Community law. In these areas alone, there
are a number of issues that remain to be resolved, such as Mem-
ber State liability for breaches of the Treaty or failure to cor-
rectly, or partially, implement directives or the liability of indi-
viduals for breach of Community law. Another issue remaining
to be resolved is the apparent dichotomy between the rules on
Member State liability and those relating to the non-contractual
liability of the Community. The impact on national law is al-
ready striking, and the creation of new remedies in these areas
would accentuate this process. A de facto harmonization of na-
tional rules in certain areas becomes inevitable.
The Court's role in this process is crucial. By discerning
61. Van Gerven, supra note 3, at 694.
JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF THE INDIVIDUAL
rights and remedies "inherent in the system of the Treaty," the
Court engages in classic judicial activism. The third generation
case law is a development indispensable to ensuring the enforce-
ment of individuals' Community law rights. Nevertheless, this
case law dictates a fundamental reassessment of national proce-
dural rules and causes of action within the context of the Com-
munity minimum standards, which will have to be provided by
the Court. It is doubtful whether Community legislators will in-
tervene, although such intervention would be welcome if the ac-
quis communautaire62 were respected. Substantive conditions for
the grant of third generation case law remedies must be speci-
fied. Issues such as compensation and the component rules gov-
erning the award of damages must be delineated.
The relationship between the Court and the Member State
courts will be decisive in this development, as the reception by
national courts of third generation remedies will be crucial to
achieve uniform application. So too will be the willingness of
national courts to refer cases to the Court.63 One positive signal
is that the House of Lords64 and apparently the Spanish Courts65
have adopted the Court's case law as regards interim relief, even
in areas which are not governed by Community law. This may
demonstrate the Member States' receptive approach to a harmo-
nization of remedies.
CONCLUSION
The early case law of the Court, as expressed in Van Gend en
Loos,66 Costa v. ENEL, 67 and Simmenthal can be viewed as the logi-
cal articulation of the requirements of the Community legal or-
der and, largely, as a negative application of the principle of ef-
62. The acquis communataire is usually defined as The Community Patrimony and in-
cludes the whole body of Community law, including the Treaties, legislation, the gen-
eral principles of law, case law, etc. See Carlo Curti Gialdino, Some Reflections on the
Acquis Communautaire, 32 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 1089-121 (1995) (further discussing
acquis communataire).
63. As The Hon. Mr. Justice Donal Barrington, writing in a non-judicial capacity,
notes, "thejudicial branch reacts to external stimuli. What it decides depends upon the
cases which come before it, but it cannot control the cases which come before it."
DONAL BARRINGTON, The Emergence of a Constitutional Court, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CON-
STITUTIONAL LAw: EssAYs IN HONOUR OF BRIAN WALSH 251, 253 (1992).
64. M. v. Home Office, [1993] 3 WLR 433; [1993] 3 All ER 537.
65. Caranta, supra note 3, at 718.
66. Van Gend en Loos, Case 26/62, [1963] E.C.R. 1, [1963] 2 C.M.L.R. 105.
67. Costa v. ENEL, Case 6/64, [1964] E.C.R. 1141, [1964] 3 C.M.L.R. 425.
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fective judicial protection. The third generation case law, in
contrast, by its imposition of Community judge-made remedies
on national law, is a positive exercise requiring the grant of rem-
edies on the basis of Community law alone. The enforcement of
Community law as a matter of Community law is now the focus.
Previously, the Court's case law had concentrated largely on sub-
stantive law, leaving enforcement to national law rules subject
only to the safeguard clause. The new approach impinges on
national law in a way that could scarcely have been foreseen.
Future developments will depend upon three factors: (1)
the reception by the national courts of the third generation case
law and their willingness to refer new cases to the Court of Jus-
tice; (2) the forbearance of the Member States in the face of
judicial activism with wide-sweeping results; and (3) the Courts'
own willingness to extend the case law. These propensities can-
not be assumed in light of the recent case law discussed above,
and in the face of increased questioning of the Court's role.
